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Economics of Regulatory Compliance in the Fisheries of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines
Abstract:
This study examined the non-compliance behavior of fishers with a zoning regulation under a condition of limited enforcement in the fisheries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Rational utility theory was used as framework for explaining compliance behavior. A stratified random sample of 568 fishers from Pekalongan and Juwana in Indonesia; Kulah Kedah, Kedah in Malaysia; and Concepcion and Tigbauan, Iloilo City, and Roxas City in the Philippines, were used in the analysis. Fishing efforts and fish landings from the various gears in the three countries were standardized using the geometric index approach.
Economic models of non-compliance behavior using logit, probit, and tobit techniques were estimated. The results indicated that economic, morality, and social influence factors determined the violation decision of individual fishers to fish in the prohibited area. Some of the legitimacy variables failed to influence the violation decision of respondents in the study. The legitimacy variables were not as important as the moral development variable in explaining the compliance behavior. This result was consistent with the findings of Paternoster et al. (1984)* that morality has a stronger influence on law breaking behavior and compliance rather than legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the reliability test for the 12 legitimacy variables was good with overall Cronbach’s alpha of 73.7 percent.
In practice, probability of detection was low and violation rates were high especially for Indonesia and the Philippines given their limited resources for enforcement and a large geographical area to monitor. In theory, the level of compliance can be improved by increasing the probability of detection and conviction or penalty rates. This can be done by either improving the enforcement process and/or its intensity. However, it was not very practical because of large financial requirements. To improve fishers’ compliance in the study area, there is a need to use other determinants of compliance such as morality and social influence factors.
In Indonesia and the Philippines, enforcement institutions were not as well established as in Malaysia. Therefore, institutions of enforcement should be given priority in Indonesia and the Philippines. In Malaysia, fairly well-developed enforcement institutions exist. To improve compliance, fisheries management authorities should also explore alternative approaches for managing fisheries. One such approach is co-management approach.
*Paternoster, R., L. Saltzman, T. Chiricos, and G. Waldo. 1984. Perceived Risk and Social
Control: Do Sanctions Really Deter? Law and Society Review 17:457-479.
